Against foreign policy radicalism

For some in the MAGA movement, it seems to be an article of faith that our post-World War II history, especially our history in this century, consists mainly of blunders and betrayals by America’s elites (the “uniparty”). I argued here that this view is profoundly radical. I also believe it to be untrue.

I agree with Roger Clegg. In an article called “A Thought About Burke and Foreign Policy,” he writes:

The world order that the West has championed since World War II has left the United States by far the richest and most powerful country on the planet. We have not seen an “end of history” and a worldwide triumph of liberal democracy, but things could be a lot worse.

The Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc have disintegrated, there have been no nuclear exchanges, there are few Communist countries left (and by far the largest of them has a semi-capitalist economy), the developing world is indeed developing because of free markets, and Islamism is on the ropes. With American foreign policy’s blend of realism and idealism, and its cautious interventionism, we are also looked up to and followed, albeit sometimes grudgingly.

Like me, Clegg sees the inherent radicalism — the anti-Burkeanism — of a large-scale rejection of the world order the West has championed:

[I don’t mean] that the system has worked perfectly or that improvements can’t be made, but we should be wary of radical change to that system and its alliances and division of roles, as well as of pursuing possible new friends at the expense of old ones. There is a time and a place to “move fast and break things,” but that’s a bad idea in U.S. foreign policy.

As [Edmund] Burke wrote in his Reflections, we ought “to look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent in pieces and put him into the kettle of magicians.”

(Emphasis added)

Until Russia invaded Ukraine, there had not been a major ground war in Europe in eight decades. Yes, Soviet troops had rolled into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but there was no real war in either nation. And, yes, there was lots of bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, but that was a civil war.

In the past 2,000 years, has there ever been an 80 year period in which no European empire, nation state, or large tribe fought on a major scale with a neighbor? With enough research, we could probably find a few, but I read lots of European history and none comes to my mind.

Europe hasn’t enjoyed this long peace because no major power had designs on its neighbors. The long peace is the result of the post-World War II security architecture America and its European allies formulated and supported.

It’s true that in recent years most of our allies haven’t supported this architecture as robustly as they should have. Donald Trump is right to insist that they increase their support.

But frustration with our allies shouldn’t cause us to turn away from them. It should not incline us, in Clegg’s words, to pursue possible new friends at the expense of old ones. Nor should we want to reward Russia for breaking the long peace.

The absence of a serious European war hasn’t just been good for Europe. As Clegg says, it’s been good for America, too.

And not just for economic reasons. During the last century, the U.S. fought in both major European wars at a tremendous cost. If Europe becomes unstable enough, we could be drawn into one of its wars again.

There is, as Clegg says, a time and a place to “move fast and break things.” I can think of some areas of American domestic policy where breakage seems appropriate. But not when it comes to breaking the world order we have championed with success since World War II.