DeSantis on Ukraine

Not wonderful but better than his critics say

Ron DeSantis has offered his views on the war in Ukraine and the proper U.S. response to that conflict. He did so, along with several other GOP presidential hopefuls, in answers to six questions posed by Tucker Carlson.

I didn’t love DeSantis’ responses, but overall they were reasonable — far more reasonable than his critics’ reaction.

Here is what I took from DeSantis’ responses: (1) he favors continuing U.S. aid to Ukraine for now, (2) there are some clear limits to how much further he would go to support Ukraine, and (3) he doesn’t want to alienate Republicans who disagree with him on (1).

Positions (1) and (2) are reasonable. So is DeSantis’ desire not to alienate the large chunk of Republicans who want to stop aiding Ukraine. However, in trying to stay on their good side, DeSantis made at least one statement that, in my opinion, can’t be defended.

For their part, DeSantis’ critics have wildly overreacted to the governor’s answers, and some of them are flatly misrepresenting his position. For example, Jonathan Last at the Bulwark claims that DeSantis is “against America’s involvement in Ukraine.” That’s simply not true, as we will see below.

At the same Substack, Charlie Sykes says DeSantis has joined the “surrender caucus.” He hasn’t. DeSantis supports sending weapons to help Ukrainians ward off Russian aggression. Thus, it’s inaccurate to say he wants a surrender to Russia.

The Washington Post claims that DeSantis’ comments “were at odds with his own words and actions when he was a congressman.” They aren’t.

The Post cites DeSantis’ vote in 2014 for an aid package to Ukraine (which was a tiny fraction of what we’re spending on such aid now) and his backing of a 2015 resolution calling on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. But there is no contradiction between these positions and anything the governor said to Carlson. DeSantis continues to back aid to Ukraine for the purpose of driving Russia out of that country.

Let’s now turn to DeSantis’ responses to Carlson’s specific questions.

The first question was “Is opposing Russia in Ukraine a vital American national strategic interest?” DeSantis said it isn’t.

The correct answer depends, of course, on how one defines “vital interest.” In the context of a foreign war, it’s reasonable to define it as an interest so strong that it justifies the deployment of U.S. troops. If we’re not willing to send in our troops, the interest at stake may be quite important, but arguably it’s not vital.

So defined, Ukraine is not a vital American national strategic interest. No one I know, and certainly not Joe Biden, has come out in favor of sending U.S. troops to fight the Russians in Ukraine.

People can disagree about the proper definition of “vital American interest” in this context. But given the strong consensus against deploying U.S. troops in Ukraine, I see nothing unreasonable in DeSantis’ denial that opposing Russia in Ukraine rises to the level of a vital American interest.

However, in his answer to the first question, DeSantis characterized the war in Ukraine as “a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia.” This comment has been greeted with scorn, and deservedly so.

Arguably, the conflict in the Dombas region of Ukraine is a territorial dispute, though even this characterization is too generous to Russia. But the war began with a Russian invasion of Ukraine directed, in part, at Kiev, and there is no reason to doubt that if Russia routs Ukrainian forces, it will renew that push.

Thus, this war is a “territorial dispute” in the same sense that Hitler’s invasion of Poland was. In other words, it’s not a territorial dispute at all. It’s an attempt by Putin to conquer an independent nation.

But for me, the important question isn’t how DeSantis characterizes the war; it’s what he’s willing to do to back Ukraine. And it’s clear from his answers to other questions posed by Carlson that he’s willing to back Ukraine to a considerable extent.

The second question was “What specifically is our objective in Ukraine, and how will we know when we’ve achieved it?” DeSantis answered that our objective should “undoubtedly be peace.”

That’s a mushy answer. Of course, we want peace, but we should not want peace between Russia and Ukraine if the price is Russia wiping Ukraine off the map.

DeSantis doesn’t want that. He continued:

The U.S. should not provide assistance that would require the deployment of American troops or enable Ukraine to engage in offensive operations beyond its borders. F-16s and long range missiles should therefore be off the table. These moves would risk explicitly drawing the United States into the conflict and drawing us closer to a hot war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. That risk is unacceptable.

From this statement, we should infer that DeSantis does not oppose providing assistance to Ukraine except for assistance in the form of (1) U.S. combat troops and (2) F-16s and long range missiles.

As noted, few disagree with DeSantis’ aversion to sending U.S. troops to fight in Ukraine. Providing F-16s and long range missiles is a more controversial matter. However, it’s my understanding that the Biden administration hasn’t provided such weapons, at least not yet.

So far, then, there doesn’t seem to be much distance between what Biden has done to help Ukraine and what DeSantis agrees should be done. And though there may be a case for supplying Ukraine with F-16s and/or long range missiles, anyone who makes that case should address DeSantis’ concerns by showing either (1) that doing so won’t create the risk of a hot war with Russia or (2) that the risk is worth taking.

The third question was “What is the limit of funding and materiel you would be willing to send to the government of Ukraine?” DeSantis’ stated limit is that we should not “provide assistance that could require the deployment of American troops or enable Ukraine to engage in offensive operations beyond its borders.”

Thus, DeSantis does not believe that providing arms needed to defend Ukrainian territory — the aid we’re providing now — crosses the limit. So much for DeSantis being against U.S. involvement in Ukraine and being part of a surrender caucus.

Carlson’s fourth question was “Should the United States support regime change in Russia?” No candidate answered in the affirmative. Most, including DeSantis and Nikki Haley, answered in the negative. Tim Scott ducked the question by not answering. Mike Pence ducked it by suggesting the question be posed to the Russian people. 

The answer to this question has to be “no,” in my view. While we can desire Putin’s ouster, we shouldn’t explicitly support it, or base policy decisions on such a desire, because of the risk that doing so would bring us into conflict with Russia or make Putin more desperate.

In his answer, DeSantis took a shot at “the DC foreign policy interventionists,” saying that regime change is popular with that crowd. I view this as DeSantis playing to the audience he doesn’t want to alienate with his support for continuing to aid Ukraine.

The fifth question was vintage Carlson. He asked “Given that Russia’s economy and currency are stronger than before the war, do you believe that U.S. sanctions have been effective?”

Pence gave the best answer. He rejected the premise that Russia’s economy is stronger than before the war.

DeSantis said the Biden administration's policies "have driven Russia into a de facto alliance with China" and that since China has not been abiding by any embargo, "Russia has increased its foreign revenues while China benefits from cheaper fuel." There is some truth in this, but it assumes — incorrectly in my view — that Russia and China weren’t already in a de facto alliance before the invasion of Ukraine. Just a few weeks before the invasion, both countries released a lengthy joint statement pledging solidarity.

Carlson’s last question was “Do you believe the United States faces the risk of nuclear war with Russia?” DeSantis’ concern about “explicitly drawing the United States into the conflict and drawing us closer to a hot war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers" answers this question.

In his statement, DeSantis sprinkled in a few additional comments designed to placate Republicans who oppose our support for Ukraine. There’s the obligatory opposition to a “blank check” for Ukraine, which no one, to my knowledge, has advocated.

There’s also a nod to accountability. DeSantis says that “our citizens are entitled to know how the billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are being utilized in Ukraine.” True, and no doubt some of the money has been wasted, as it always is. But let’s have that accounting for anyone who wants to get into those weeds.

DeSantis goes on to admonish that we cannot prioritize intervention in an escalating foreign war over the defense of our own homeland from the threat of posed by “narcotics” to our citizens. Yes, but supplying aid to Ukraine is unlikely to detract from whatever efforts we might make in the war on drugs and the cartels that supply them.

Finally, DeSantis warns that “our weapons arsenals critical for our own security are rapidly being depleted.” So this another potential limit on providing aid to Ukraine. And it’s a reasonable one. But DeSantis doesn’t say that we’ve reached, or are near, the point that this concern means we should halt or cut back on aid.

In the end, DeSantis’ answers are a mixed bag from my perspective — mostly reasonable positions, one or two unreasonable comments, and some wiggle room.

Meanwhile, the shrill, dishonest responses to DeSantis’ answers by his enemies offer a taste of what’s to come, as outlets like the Bulwark and the Washington Post prepare to portray him as the second coming of Donald Trump.