Louis Van Gaal's World Cup masterclass

Team America’s World Cup came to an end today at the hands of Holland, in a 3-1 defeat. Holland won because it has somewhat better players, because the U.S. spurned two scoring opportunities gifted by the Dutch, and because two of our best players, Tyler Adams and Sergino Dost, failed to track runners on a pair of Dutch goals.

So it wasn’t coaching that drove the result.

However, Louis van Gaal’s tactical masterclass made Holland’s victory comfortable. For fans of the sport, his tactics are worth considering.

Under van Gaal, Holland usually plays three center backs and two wing-backs. Two of the center backs, Timber and Ake, are good and the third, Van Dijk, is great.

The two wing-backs are okay, but have weaknesses. Dumfries is great going forward but is not a conscientious or particularly effective defender. Blind is a good defender, but isn’t pacey going forward.

With this presumably in mind, van Gaal used a different approach at the back today, relying on four defenders instead of three/five. Timber, a strong defender, moved from right center back to conventional right back. Blind moved from left wing-back to conventional left back. Dumfries, now largely free of defensive duties, became a conventional attacking winger, more or less.

This move had several virtues. It put Dumfries and Blind in positions that better matched their skills. It created a reliable counter-attacking outlet, Dumfries. When the Dutch gained possession, he normally had acres of space because the U.S. was pushing up that flank (more about that in a moment).

It also enabled Holland to bypass midfield, normally a major U.S. strength, without kicking the ball long, with the attendant risk of turning it over. Instead, the Dutch could kick it wide to Dumfries. He would streak, largely unimpeded, into the final third of the field and then try to pick out a teammate in front of goal — usually Memphis Depay.

Van Gaal had his forwards press the U.S. defenders at times, but mostly “invited” us in to attack. This set up counterattacks using Dumfries as the outlet.

Every soccer tactic has its downside, though. The problem with van Gaal’s gambit is that it left Blind exposed at left back to two of our fastest attackers — Dest, the right back, and Weah, the right-side forward.

But the U.S. didn’t try to exploit this. The game plan must have been to attack mostly down the left, trying to exploit the space between Dumfries and Timber, and relying on the skill of Pulisic, who was playing on that side.

This might have been a sound approach had the Dutch been defending with Dumfries and Timber. But with Dumfries up the field, our attack was encountering Timber directly, with Van Dijk backing him up. The U.S. found little joy attacking them.

It wasn’t until the 41st minute that Dest and Weah combined to storm down the right flank. The result? A strong shot for Weah that required the first meaningful save by the Dutch goalkeeper, other than the one very early when a turnover allowed Pulisic a clear shot on goal.

At half time Holland led 2-0 ,with both goals assisted by Dumfries. The player I considered Holland’s weak link, and whom the U.S. had wanted to exploit, was well on his way to a man-of-the-match performance.

I hoped that the success of our 41st minute foray down the right flank would lead to more such attacks by Dest and Weah in the second half. Instead, the U.S. moved Weah inside to center forward and brought in Reyna to play on the right. The 20-year-old had a few good moments cutting inside, but didn’t run much at Blind. As for Weah, he was replaced in the 64th minute.

Meanwhile, Blind had become an attacking force. With the threat of Dumfries tilting the U.S. to that side of field, Blind was able to get forward and profit from cross-field switches of play, sometimes directly from Dumfries.

At the end of the match, the U.S. had more shots and more shots on target than Holland. However, our shots, other than the ones resulting from turnovers, were against an organized defense pressuring our attackers. Many of Holland’s shots were against a stretched American defense scrambling to deal with counterattacks, and not always tracking back conscientiously.

One more note on van Gaal. He brought on two substitutes at the start of the second half. Teams rarely do that when they’re leading 2-0. Moreover, one of the subs was a forward replacing a midfielder. An attacking substitution by a team with a two goal lead is especially rare.

But van Gaal must have sensed that the U.S. would come out with guns blazing to start the second half (which we did). He wanted to freshen up the team and to inject yet more pace into it, knowing that the U.S. would be even more vulnerable than before to the counterattack.

Van Gaal knew a third goal would clinch the match. Holland got it. From Dumfries. Who else?

Holland’s next opponent is Argentina. The Argentines defeated van Gaal’s Holland in the 2014 semifinals on penalty kicks. The Dutch held Argentina scoreless for two hours, thwarting Lionel Messi in the process.

I look forward to seeing what the Dutch mastermind comes up with against Messi & company this time.