Netanyahu enforces Trump's deadline

On April 12, President Trump told the Iranian regime it had 60 days to make a deal to end its nuclear program. Yesterday, on the 61st day after this warning, Israel launched a full-scale attack on that program and the military leaders behind it.

Trump says that “Iran should have listened to me when. . .I gave them a 60-day warning.” But the regime instead tried to draw out negotiations while it rushed to develop nukes.

The regime’s approach was rational if one considers the context. A few years ago, Iran was a Mideast heavyweight — next to Israel, the Mideast heavyweight. Its power stemmed less from its own military capabilities, though they were not inconsiderable, than from its proxies — mainly Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, in that order. It was the ability of these proxies to wreak havoc in a multi-front war that made Iran so feared.

But since October 7, 2023, Iran’s power and status have plummeted. First, Israel crushed Hamas. Then it crushed Hezbollah. In addition, its attacks on Iran severely damaged the regime’s ability to protect its nuclear program for substantial damage and its leaders from oblivion.

The only way for Iran to restore its power was to complete the development of a nuclear weapons capability. How? By accelerating its nuclear program while drawing out negotiations to buy time.

Israeli intelligence concluded that Iran was, in fact, rushing to develop nuclear weapons and was not far from getting some. Anyone who doubts the quality of Israeli intelligence about Iran should consult the families of those dead members of Iran’s military command.

Iran’s regime could have heeded Trump’s warning and negotiated an end to its nuclear program. But in doing so, it would have negotiated an end to its status as a significant player in the Middle East. It would have negotiated the icing on the cake of the regime’s post-October 7 humiliation. It would have negotiated the demise of its raison d'être — to lead a holy war against Israel and the West.

Given what looked like a plausible alternative, the decision to reject capitulation was rational.

Iran’s calculus drove Israel’s. With Iran rushing towards nuclear weapons capability, Israel had no real choice but to strike.

With that capability, Iran would have posed a threat to Israel’s safety and possibility to its existence. Perhaps Iran would not have risked attacking Israel with nukes, but Israel could accept the risk that the mullahs would.

In any case, merely by having nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime would have posed an unacceptable risk to Israel. With such weapons, Iran could have rebuilt its terrorist proxies and removed retaliation for attacks on Israel as an option. Indeed, no nation in the Middle East (and perhaps eventually not even the U.S.) would have been able to stand in Iran’s way.

This is why American presidents have consistently said that Iran must not get nuclear weapons. Even Joe Biden said the U.S. would never allow it. (Whether he meant it or even knew what he was saying is unclear.)

But even if Iran hadn’t been rushing to develop nukes, Israel’s attacks make sense. Suppose Iran was three-to-five years away from its goal, not a year or less. The fact remains that the regime has never been more vulnerable than now to an Israeli attack, and would probably never be this vulnerable again.

In three-to-five years, Iran could rebuild its air defense system. It could build a larger stockpile of ballistic missiles to fire at Israel. It might also be able to rebuild some of its proxy forces. And in four-to-five years, a left-wing Democrat might be President of the United States.

This was the time for Israel to strike.

In Israel’s case, then, the government made what almost certainly was the right decision. In Iran’s case, the regime’s decision might prove to be the wrong one, but it was rational.

What about the United States? Before assessing its approach, we must first ask what that approach was.

We know that Trump publicly counseled against an Israeli attack. We know that Trump maintained this posture even as his 60-day warning was about to expire. We know that he continued publicly to push for negotiations, not war. And we know that when the attack occurred, Secretary of State Rubio distanced America from it.

However, I’ve heard reports that go so far as to claim that Trump’s anti-war admonitions were a smokescreen designed to give the Iranian regime a false sense that Israel would not attack. If so, bravo Trump. But I’m not convinced that it is so.

In any event, the U.S. reportedly is helping Israel defend itself against Iran’s missile attacks. Thus, even if we weren’t in on a deception of Iran and even if we didn’t want Israel to attack, we’re on the right side of the war now, when it really counts.

I think it’s fair, then, to characterize the administration’s overall approach to this conflict as follows: Side with and help Israel but insist that this was Israel’s attack, not America’s. This approach puts us on the right side of the war without making us a primary player.

The administration is trying to thread the needle. By denying a role in the attacks and coupling this denial with warnings to the Iranian regime not to attack U.S. assets, we hope to minimize the likelihood of retaliation against America to the full extent possible without abandoning Israel.

It’s a rational approach, but was there a better one? To me, the answer depends on whether Israel acting alone has the capability to deal a death blow to Iran’s nuclear program. If so, then it makes all the sense in the world for the U.S. to have Israel act without direct U.S. participation.

However, we’ve heard for years that Israel lacks the tonnage to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities embedded underground, deep in Iran’s mountains. Supposedly, these can only be destroyed by U.S. bunker busters.

I don’t know whether it is today, but if it is I would have preferred U.S. participation. As I noted, U.S. presidents of both political parties have said, for good reason, that the Iranian regime, a sworn enemy of America, must not obtain nuclear weapons. Israel’s attacks provide a path — the only realistic one, in my view — for making sure Iran does not get them.

If Israel can’t fully do the job without some U.S. participation, then the U.S. should participate, and not just by helping with Israel’s defense. Iran will perceive the U.S. as its adversary in this conflict without distinguishing between offense and defense. That distinction is not the key to preventing Iran from going after us. The key is fear by the mullahs of U.S. retaliation against regime leaders and economic targets.

Thus, if our participation was needed to succeed in destroying Iran’s nuclear program once and for all, I think we should have participated. As they say: In for a dime, in for a dollar.