The dangers of radicalism, both Democratic and Republican

It’s my contention that both major American political parties are radical. By a radical party, I mean one that views the country as in need of a major transformation on multiple fronts.

A party isn’t radical merely by virtue of wanting to overhaul certain aspects of society, such as its immigration policy, the way it educates people, or the size of its government. This is especially true if all the party really wants is a return to something resembling past practices. But when a party aims to overhaul fundamental, longstanding arrangements on multiple fronts, it is radical.

To say that a party is radical is not to say that it is wrong. It’s possible for a country’s fundamental, longstanding arrangements to be in need of an overthrow.

But a radical party damn sure must be right. For, as conservatives have always understood, overthrowing fundamental, traditional arrangements is a dangerous business, full of unintended consequences. And once they are overthrown, it’s very hard to restore them.

This column by Megan McCardle highlights the perils of the radicalism of both major parties. McCardle emphasizes the “reputational damage” — the lack of trust — that occurs when radicals overhaul our institutions. This is far from the only adverse consequence of radicalism, but it’s an important one.

Here is McCardle’s take on the radicalism of the contemporary Democratic Party:

I hardly need to recap how progressives, empowered by social media, reshaped institutions from 2013 to 2023. Some of these changes were overdue, such as stronger policing of sexual harassment. Others, like many of the DEI trainings, were well intended but somewhere between useless and counterproductive. But much of what happened, including the firings of prominent newspaper editors for publishing fairly common opinions and the internal inquisitions that roiled many progressive organizations, was inimical to a pluralistic society and the institutions themselves.

The progressives meant well enough; they thought that the power and influence of the institutions they worked for should be deployed to rectify historical injustices. What they failed to understand was that these institutions’ power and influence consisted mostly of reputational capital. And reputational capital rests entirely on the expectation that you will pursue commonly accepted goals, such as “the truth,” not some other, more personal project.

I’m not convinced that “the progressives meant well enough,” but McCardle’s point stands. The radical transformation of core institutions by left-liberals “was inimical to a pluralistic society and to the institutions themselves.”

Moreover,

It will take those institutions decades to restore the trust they lost in the space of a few years — if indeed that trust can be regained at all. Among other consequences, that loss is what opened universities up to the current attacks by the Trump administration. Conservatives have long wanted to take universities down a peg, or 80, but they were constrained by the risk of a backlash from voters. That constraint no longer binds in the way it once did.

The Trump GOP’s radicalism resides primarily in its quest to radically transform the global economic order through a trade policy that, rightly or wrongly, fell into disrepute nearly a century ago. Of this quest, McCardle writes;

What [Trump] has touched off is not just a trade war; it risks turning into a run on the United States of America.

Financial markets can be unpredictable, but relationships tend to hold. For example, when you impose tariffs, your currency should strengthen, because foreigners still need to buy your currency to purchase your exports, while you’re buying less of their currency to purchase their exports. (At least, until they impose retaliatory tariffs that crush your exports.)

Another example: When stock markets dive, bond markets tend to get stronger, as anxious investors move their money into less volatile assets. Demand rises for government debt, especially for U.S. government debt, the ultimate safe asset. Since demand is higher, the interest rate lowers, meaning borrowed money gets cheaper — which is nice, because that helps offset some of the economic damage from cratering stock portfolios.

And yet … the dollar is down since Trump started his “Liberation Day” tariff adventures. So is the S&P 500, of course, but bond yields haven’t fallen like one would expect. Investors suddenly seem a bit wary of all things American. There are technical reasons for some of this, trades being “unwound” and so forth. But there’s a real risk we’re losing our status as the premier destination for global financial capital — a status that is crucial to growing our economy and maintaining our standard of living. (All that foreign money funds business investment.) And that means a real risk for an administration that would like to finance trillions of dollars’ worth of unfunded tax cuts. . . .

(Emphasis added)

Notice that McCardle speaks in terms of “risk.” It’s too early to say that Trump’s trade policies will have the dire consequences she describes. But it’s not too early to say they put us at serious risk.

McCardle’s lesson for both of our radical parties is this:

What was accumulated over decades of patient rectitude can be lost in one quick burst of irresponsibility. Once you’ve raised questions about your integrity, it is hard to return to the status quo.

Conservatives have always understood this. But today, neither major American party is conservative.