Washington Post blames Israel's alleged lack of a post-war strategy for war being hell in Gaza.

But we're not even at the post-war stage.

The Washington Post’s latest anti-Israel front-page story contends that chaos in northern Gaza stems from the lack of a viable post-war strategy by Israel. I think the chaos stems from the fact that war is chaotic and, indeed, hell for populations on the losing side — especially when the enemy believes it profits from hellish conditions.

The notion that a victor is supposed to have a “post-war” strategy that avoids chaos and terrible hardship for the loser puzzles me. Even more puzzling is the notion that a victor should have a strategy that avoids these things while the war is occurring.

Did northern media outlets bemoan the absence of a strategy that prevented chaos and great hardship in Georgia after Gen. Sherman headed north to the Carolinas? Did the Washington Post whine about the horrible conditions that prevailed in southern Italian cities as allied forces headed north during World War II. Did they blame the hardship in Berlin following Germany’s surrender on poor post-war planning?

I’m pretty sure the answer is “no” in all cases.

There was a time when post-war planning was easy. The Roman Empire’s post-war plan was to bring the leaders of conquered territory to the capital in chains, parade them through the streets, enslave the indigenous population, and distribute conquered land to members of the Roman army.

The Ottoman Turks brought in their own administrators and treated the natives (of defeated Greek cities passably well if the city surrendered without a fight. If the city didn’t, the post-war strategy was to kill the men and sell the women and children into slavery.

We’ve come a long way from those practices to the IDF bringing incubators to Al-Shifa hospital (a facility used by Hamas) to save premature babies and providing safety corridors for Gazans to move from north to south.

Our post-World War II strategy was to occupy Germany and Japan while working out the imposition of a democratic system of governance. It was a good strategy for these countries. However, as noted, there was plenty of hardship and chaos during the interim.

Good post-war strategies are harder to come by in 21st century wars. But as I’ll argue below, this reality doesn’t counsel against going to war when it makes sense to do so.

We don’t know what Israel’s post-war strategy in Gaza will be, or whether it currently has one. (The Post admits that Israel has worked with Gazan businessmen to bring food to northern Gaza, a strategy stymied by Hamas’ threats against these “collaborators.”) We also don’t know whether, or to what extent, the strategy Israel ultimately implements in Gaza will stem chaos and reduce hardship. (Maybe once Hamas is fully defeated, “collaboration” with sensible Gazan will be possible. Maybe not.)

We do know, or should, that it’s ridiculous to expect an absence of chaos and great hardship at this stage of the war, given Hamas’ determination to hide behind residents of Gaza and to steal humanitarian aid.

Behind the criticism that Israel lacks a post-war plan lurks the assumption that a nation shouldn’t go to war without good one. This is a cousin of the notion that a nation shouldn’t go to war without an “exit strategy” and “off-ramps.”

The latter argument strikes me as too defeatist. The former one seems too demanding. It also assumes, incorrectly I think, that post-war plans that predate hostilities are likely to have much relevance when hostilities end.

In my view, going to war is the right option if (1) the war is just, (2) the war is likely to be won at a cost that’s acceptable to the nation considering this option, (3) the situation after victory is likely to be preferable for the nation considering war to the pre-war situation, and (4) the public supports going to war and is unlikely to change its mind after a few setbacks. In my view, the likelihood that the nation or entity against which war is to be waged will experience chaos and severe hardship is not a reason to abstain from war.

Thus, the absence of a plan to avoid such chaos and hardship should not be a deal-breaker. The absence of any post-war plan shouldn’t be either, as long as the nation considering war has good reason to believe that after the war ends, the situation will be better for it than the current one, in any likely post-war scenario. (This is not an argument against having a post-war plan; only against the requirement of having one.)

In Israel’s case, its leaders knew the IDF would prevail against Hamas and they had good reason to believe that inflicting a crushing defeat on Hamas would make Israel significantly safer in any plausible post-war scenario. Furthermore, after the horrors inflicted by Hamas on October 7, a war against these terrorists was both just and overwhelmingly supported by Israelis.

Israeli’s leaders also knew their forces would suffer many casualties and that war would harm the Israeli economy. However, they believed, reasonably, that this cost was acceptable given the benefits of defeating Hamas.

All of this seems straightforward. The matter becomes more complicated when we factor in the cost to Israel of lost U.S. support now and especially in the future. Did Israel’s leaders understand that the Democratic party would turn against Israel if the IDF went all-in against Hamas?

I don’t know. But even if they did realize this, I believe that going to war in Gaza and going all-out to win the war was the correct decision.

With or without a post-war strategy.