What dilemma?

The course Israel must take is clear.

David Leonhardt of the New York Times claims that Israel faces “a strategic dilemma” when it comes to its fight against Hamas. On the one hand, he argues, there are good reasons for a cease fire, followed by “international peace talks.” On the other hand, there are good reasons to keep fighting without letting up.

Leonhardt states these reasons, as he sees them. A cease fire, he contends, would ease diplomatic pressure on Israel. It would play well with many Democrats in the U.S. It would produce the release of more hostages.

On the other hand, Leonhardt agrees that a cessation of hostilities “would make Israel look weak.” It would enable Hamas to claim victory.

Most importantly, it would leave Israel well short of its stated goal — to destroy Hamas — as well as its promise to kill or capture Hamas’ leaders and decimate its fighters. This would leave Hamas in a much better position to terrorize and attack Israel in the future.

I understand “dilemma” to mean more than just a situation in which a choice must be made between two options that both carry negative consequences. A dilemma exists only when the choice is difficult.

That’s not the case when it comes to a cease fire. No rational country would ever back down from trying to eliminate a deadly enemy that has viciously attacked it, just to enhance its standing with international opinion or to ease diplomatic pressure.

But the reason why there’s no dilemma here isn’t just that protecting national security is far more important than currying favor with the international community. In addition, there’s no dilemma because Israel cannot improve its international standing, or its long-term standing in the U.S., by backing down in the fight against Hamas.

Hatred of Israel is only tangentially related to how it combats Hamas. The real causes of that hatred are anti-Semitism, anti-Whiteness, and hatred of the “colonialist” West.

The contemporary left divides the world into oppressor and oppressed; “whites” and “people of color“ (aka “the other”); “colonialist” and victim of colonialism. It views Israel as being on the wrong side of each divide.

In the left’s telling, Israel has stolen land from the Palestinians and subjected them to a reign of colonialist oppression. To make matters worse, Israelis are “white” and Palestinians are “of color.” (A stroll down the streets of Tel Aviv or Haifa might suggest otherwise, but never mind.)

In this universe, Israel must always be the villain. Indeed, it must always be evil. Fighting hard against Hamas will bring out protesters, but ceasing that fight won’t change Israel’s status in the left’s ontology. It won’t create good will.

But what about the U.S. It has long supported Israel. Aren’t the left-liberals here an exception to the rule that prevails in Europe?

The answer, I think, is “yes,” but only for the time being. Traditional Democrats like Steny Hoyer, Chuck Schumer, and maybe Joe Biden disagree with some of what Israel does but do not consider the Jewish state to be inherently evil.

But, these leaders are old. Soon, they will exit the scene. As I argued here and here, within a decade or so, the leftist view of Israel that I’ve described above will prevail among Democrats And without bipartisan support, Israel will have to fend off its enemies without America’s backing.

The signs are obvious — in public opinion polls; in the large number of youngish White House staffers who objected to Biden’s stance in this war; in State Department officials accusing Israel of genocide.

Short of making concessions that would place Israel in existential danger, there’s nothing Israel can do to win the support of the emerging Democratic party. I’m not sure that even such concessions would do the trick.

Leonhardt also mentions the impact of Israel’s war against Hamas on relations with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis seemed close to normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel, but have pulled back now that Israel is killing civilians in Gaza.

My discussion of how the left views Israel obviously does not apply to the Saudis. They can’t be accused of being left-liberals.

But neither can they be accused of being sentimentalists. If anyone understands Israel’s need to destroy Hamas, it’s the Saudis.

Thus, we should expect that once this war ends in an Israeli victory, the Saudis’ focus will once again be on the advantages of normalized relations with Israel. After a decent interval, it’s reasonable to expect negotiations towards normalization to resume.

What if they don’t? Israel will still be better off by virtue of the damage it has inflicted on Hamas.

This leads me, though, to a counter to the argument I’ve been making here. Yes, it’s unrealistic to believe that Israel can create good will by not going all in against Hamas. But maybe it’s also unrealistic to believe that Israel can destroy Hamas by going all in against it.

Leonhardt makes that point. To him, “the thought Israel’s stated goal of eliminating Hamas, down to every fighter and weapon, is probably impossible.”

I agree, and have made the same point. In my view, Israel can’t destroy Hamas once and for all:

Even in the aftermath of the most successful attack on Gaza possible, Israel will still confront (1) an ideology that’s as strong, if not stronger, than ever, (2) masses of Palestinians amenable to joining Hamas, and (3) leaders who can take advantage of (1) and (2). In addition, unless the Iranian regime is overthrown, Hamas will have the backing of that regime, which will serve as a source of funds and, eventually, maybe weapons.

However:

What Israel can accomplish, if all goes well, is (1) killing Hamas’ military commanders in Gaza, (2) killing most of Hamas’ foot soldiers, (3) completely destroying Hamas’ arsenal of weapons, (4) completely destroying Hamas’ infrastructure and tunnel system, and (5) ending, at least for a time, the flow from Iran (or anywhere else) into Gaza of weapons and other material that can be used to wage war against Israel.

That should be sufficient to make Israel secure from Hamas for at least a decade.

Israel can’t get anything like that amount of security if it goes the ceasefire route. Thus, it faces no dilemma.