What should Israel do about Gaza when the war ends?

David Ignatius, unofficial spokesman for the deep state, returns to a favorite theme of Israel bashers: The alleged lack of planning by Israel’s leaders for what happens in Gaza when the war is over.

I say “alleged” because Ignatius doesn’t show there has been a lack of such planning. Maybe Israel has a plan it hasn’t shared with Ignatius’ sources. Maybe it has a plan and has shared it, but it’s not one that Ignatius and his sources like.

Here’s the plan they like: First, a massive influx of humanitarian aid for Gaza. Second, an “international stabilization force” to keep the peace.

Third — here it comes — Israeli agreement to a Palestinian state. Ignatius views this element as critical because it’s what he really, really wants only with such an agreement will Arab states agree to furnish “peacekeepers” in Gaza (he says).

Fourth, the Palestinian Authority should eventually replace Hamas as the governing body of Gaza, subject to “tight controls” and “performance metrics.” Who will exercise that control and how they will make it stick, Ignatius doesn’t say.

Before considering the specifics of this scenario, it’s helpful to take a step back and recognize Gaza for what it is — a hotbed of anti-Zionism and Jew-hatred. Any post-war plan that doesn’t proceed from this recognition cannot be taken seriously.

The anti-Israeli media pretends there are two distinct sets of Gazans — Hamas members and “innocent civilians.” This is nonsense.

Hamas is the natural outgrowth of a culture that despises Jews and desires the destruction of Israel. Polls show that Gazans (1) support Hamas, with its most militant wings more popular than any other part of the organization and (2) disfavor the “two-state solution” so near to Ignatius’ heart. This means they favor Palestine “from the river to the sea” — i.e., the destruction of Israel and its Jewish inhabitants (unless, perhaps, the Israelis are willing to slink away).

Remember that terrorist who, on October 7, celebrated with his parents by phone after he killed several Jews? Remember how the parents were overcome with joy and pride in their son for his murderous deeds?

Who, other than a Jew-hater, would consider these parents “innocent civilians”? Who, other than a Jew-hater, would mourn if, as a result of the war, they were among the dead in Gaza? Not me.

Ignatius might claim that these parents are outliers, but I doubt that’s the case. The hatred that fueled rape and other unspeakable brutality on October 7 is in the air Gazans breathe. It’s instilled almost from birth by parents. It’s reinforced in schools and summer camps where, for fun, little kids practice attacking mock-ups of Jews.

Jew hatred is a way of life in Gaza and October 7 was the fulfillment of a dream shared throughout Gaza. It was a cause for celebration and was, in fact, celebrated.

This is not to say that all Gazans support Hamas. Some support alternative groups of Israel-haters like the Palestinian Authority. Others, no doubt, don’t support any militant group.

But not all Germans supported the Nazis. I dare say that the percentage of Gazans who are pro-Hamas is greater than the percentage of Germans who supported the Nazis by the time the U.S. firebombed Dresden in World War II. But the Allies understood that it wasn’t enough to defeat Germany militarily. They had to de-Nazify it. (Unfortunately, de-Hamasification wouldn’t work in Gaza.)

Given the realities of Gaza, what should Israel’s approach be when the fighting ends there? Clearly, its approach should be guided by only one consideration — making sure Israel isn’t attacked again from that territory. Helping the Jew-haters rebuild should not be part of Israel’s program.

Can Israel rely on an “international stabilization force” to accomplish Israel’s security objective? I don’t think so. Faced with an enemy population as intractable as Gaza’s, Israel can’t outsource the protection of its people.

But even if outsourcing made sense, who would be crazy enough to enter a cauldron of hatred and violence like Gaza as a “peacekeeper”? Ignatius says Arabs would do it, if Israel promises to support a Palestinian state.

Maybe. Maybe not. But this sort of concession should be a non-starter, in any case. Polls show at least as much pro-Hamas sentiment in the West Bank as in Gaza. A Palestinian state encompassing both territories would leave Israel vulnerable to another October 7-style attack.

Moreover, agreeing to a two-state solution as a result of events triggered by the massacre of October 7 would likely make Hamas even more popular than it is now. It’s true that Palestinians don’t see two states as a solution. However, they would welcome a state alongside Israel as a way-station to a one-state solution. Gaining that way-station would make Hamas irresistibly heroic, to Palestinians.

In any case, an international stabilization force would not meet Israel’s security needs. Who imagines that such a force would be willing to crack down on Hamas and other terrorist outfits? The world has shown it’s not on Israel’s side. Clearly, soldiers from Arab, third world, and European countries can’t be counted on to risk their lives to protect Israel.

Indeed, “international peacekeepers” might well imitate the U.N. “observers” who, during the 1967 war, happily stood down when Jordanian troops moved against their headquarters in West Jerusalem. It took the bloodiest fighting in that war for Israel to remove the Jordanians.

Ignatius doesn’t mention the U.N. in his discussion of peacekeepers. Smart move. The hostility of U.N. personnel towards Israel has been on display for many months. But any “stabilization force” can be expected to behave like a U.N. force. In other words, passively at best.

Ignatius does mention the Palestinian Authority. Indeed, he assigns it the major role in local governance. For the reasons I presented here, in an argument that relied in part on the Washington Post’s reporting, this fantasy stuff.

So how should Israel protect itself from Gazans after the war ends? The first priority must be to destroy Hamas’ tunnels. If that infrastructure remains in place, Hamas will be able to regroup and begin plotting its next attack.

More broadly, Israel should rely on its own forces to protect its security interests in Gaza. This probably means keeping some of them strategically located in Gaza, sort of like they are in the West Bank but in smaller numbers because there are no Israeli residents to protect in Gaza.

These forces would serve two purposes. First, they could, themselves, act against militants. Second, they could serve as a kind of trip-wire. At the first sign of trouble, including the launching of any missile from Gaza at Israel, Israeli forces would return to Gaza in force.

As for Gaza humanitarian aid and reconstruction, Israel should not contribute a penny. Neither, for that matter, should the U.S, though it’s certain that we will. There are people all over the world who could use humanitarian aid. All of them have a better claim to it than the Jew-hating, terrorist-supporting population of Gaza.

It’s clear, however, that money will begin pouring into Gaza once the war ends. If the IDF presence looms over Gaza, its residents will then have a choice. They could reject Hamas, now a much less powerful force, and get serious about rebuilding their territory (as opposed to rebuilding Hamas’ military and war infrastructure). In this scenario, Gazans would provide intel the IDF could use to prevent Hamas from regaining a foothold.

Alternatively, Gazans could back Hamas and other militants, as they have done in the past. This scenario would entail frequent IDF interventions that would stand in the way of rebuilding Gaza, but it would scratch the Jew-hating itch.

My guess is that Gazans will opt to scratch that itch. But it’s possible that, this time, they will choose more wisely.

Either way, Israel likely will face no threat from Gaza in the future. The only scenario in which Hamas or a similar successor likely reemerges as a threat is one in which Israel relies on others to prevent this outcome.