Which way in Iran?

The Trump administration has ordered a military buildup in the Gulf region that, according to what I’ve read, is beyond impressive. That the U.S., as a result, can now wage a massive war against the Iranian regime seems beyond dispute. The questions are will it and should it.

As to the “will it” question, Trump says his goal is to bring Iran to the negotiating table. I believe him. I don’t think he wants a war.

I also believe Iran is willing to negotiate and probably already is doing so at some level. But is Iran just stalling or will it agree to a deal that satisfies Trump?

The answer depends on what would satisfy Trump. I hope his demand is that Iran cease its nuclear weapons program, permit the inspections needed to ensure compliance, and halt terrorist operations in the region. But it’s conceivable that Trump would settle for less than a dismantling of the nuclear program, albeit a much tougher deal than the one Obama negotiated.

Trump would not agree, of course, to a deal that includes the disgraceful payments Team Obama gifted the mullahs. However, he might well agree to a lifting, at least to some extent, of economic sanctions. I doubt Iran would agree to a deal that doesn’t include sanctions relief.

My guess — and it’s nothing more — is that Iran will not agree to a deal that satisfies Trump. I think Trump will realize this sooner rather than later, and instead of having our forces sit in the region or go home having accomplished nothing, he will order some form of attack on Iran.

Frankly, that’s also my hope, for two reasons. First, Iran can’t be trusted to adhere to a tough deal, and Trump won’t be president long enough to assure future compliance.

Second, assuming, as I do, that the deal would involve a lifting or lightening of sanctions, it would help the mullahs maintain their stranglehold on power. How sad it would be if, following the recent rebellion and Trump’s promises of support, the U.S. ends up further entrenching the regime.

If we attack Iran, what kind of attack will we launch? The two broad options (other than a small strike to demonstrate seriousness and push Iran to the negotiating table) are (1) an attempt to take out or substantially further degrade Iran’s nuclear program and (2) an all out air attack on the regime designed to bring about its overthrow.

In the first scenario, at least as described by one former defense department official, we would target missile launch sites, many of them mobile; supply depots; air defense systems; and the transportation networks used to move weapons. These targets are located all over Iran. Of course, degrading the nuclear program wouldn’t require hitting them all, but surely it would require a significantly larger campaign than last year’s strikes on a small number of major facilities.

In the second scenario, we would attack thousands of sites, including command-and-control nodes, security services, and key buildings tied to Khamenei. The campaign could extend for weeks or even months.

I think Trump will favor the first option. For one thing, he likes his wars quick. For another, it’s far from clear that a multi-week or even a multi-month war would result in regime change. American boots on the ground might well be necessary to achieve that outcome. Trump, for good reason, doesn’t want to go there.

As for the value of the first option —further degrading Iran’s nuclear program — it depends on (1) the extent to which it already has been degraded by our last strikes and (2) the extent to which an air campaign can set the program back even further. This value — whatever it is — must be weighed against the disadvantages of the air campaign.

The major disadvantage is the prospect of Iranian retaliation, including attacks on U.S. assets in the region, U.S. diplomats, and our allies (especially Israel).

Max Boot warns that attacks on Iran could strengthen the regime by producing a rally-around-the-flag effect. That’s possible. But after the latest savage wave of repression, it’s not easy to see a significant rallying behind the mullahs. It’s also worth noting that the most recent rebellion came less than a year after the summer bombing. In fact, students have renewed their anti-regime protests even as war looms.

Of the two attack scenarios, I prefer the more limited air campaign. My main reason is the likely futility of bringing about regime change through a bombing campaign. In addition, there’s a question as to whether the U.S. can prudently spare the munitions required for a long bombing campaign.

The other option is for Trump to back down and send our ships back to where they came from without inflicting harm on Iran. This seems like a non-starter, and for good reason. Backing down would be both a blow to our credibility and the rejection of an opportunity to deliver a much-deserved blow to the regime.

Finally, there’s the question of whether Trump needs congressional authorization to attack Iran. I discussed this issue in connection with his military campaign in and around Venezuela.

My view is that Trump is required by law to obtain authorization for either of the two kinds of campaigns discussed herein. I also think it would be prudent for him to obtain it if he has anything other than a quick strike in mind.

However, I think it’s very unlikely that Trump will seek congressional approval for whatever he decides to do.